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GOVERNMENTAL ENFORCEMENT POWERS IN THE
REGULATION OF THE DRUG INDUSTRY
by S. David Blinn
Perhaps justifiably, most contemporary writing dealing with the "drug
problem" in this country treats only one aspect of that subject-the
problem of drug abuse.' To many people, current attitudes with respect
to the use or abuse of drugs seem to herald a change in social, moral, and
religious traditions. However, whether the governing of these traditions
properly is a legal problem remains unanswered. Existing laws treat drugs
as a potential threat to the health and safety of the public, and accordingly,
any other than a theoretical discussion of the drug problem must focus on
these factors. Under this view the distinction between the "use" and
"abuse" of drugs is largely illusory, since distinctions can be drawn only
with respect to the magnitude of the threat posed to public health and
safety. Although it could be hypothesized that a greater threat is posed
by drugs used without knowledge of their potential danger than is posed
by those used in complete awareness of potential harm, it seems best for
purposes of this Comment to assume that all drugs posing a threat to
health and safety should be considered together. To do otherwise would
re-entangle the drug problem with social, moral, and religious factors.
It is significant that in past years, public concern has focused on the
aspect of the drug problem suggested above: the use of potentially harm-
ful drugs without knowledge of their danger. One need only recall the
tragic effects of "Elixir of Sulfanilamide" in 1937,' or of the use of tha-
lidomide in the past decade, to observe this fact. In each instance, public
opinion has prompted congressional action to protect consumers against
the production and distribution of unsafe drugs.' It is because of the
salutary effect which governmental regulation has had, and because of
the voluntary efforts of many members of the drug industry, that the fear
of distribution of unsafe drugs by the industry has largely subsided. How-
ever, it is difficult to speak in terms of one "drug industry." Perhaps no
other industry in the country incorporates quite as many distinct phases
of operation, or represents such a large number of economically diverse
enterprises, as does the drug industry.4 In such a complex industry, affect-
'This is also true with respect to legal writing. See, e.g., Burnett, Crisis in Narcotics-Are
Existing Federal Penalties Effective?, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 636 (1969); Ford, LSD and the
Law: A Framework for Policy Making, 54 MINN. L. REV. 775 (1970); Kramer, The State Versus
the Addict: Uncivil Commitment, 50 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1970); Rosenthal, A Plea for Amelioration
of the Marihuana Laws, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 1359 (1969); Comment, Narcotic Addiction: A Con-
tinuing Problem, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 768 (1968); Note, Control and Treatment of Narcotic
Addicts: Civil Commitment in California, 6 SAN Dinso L. REV. 35 (1969); Note, Methadone
Maintenance for Heroin Addicts, 78 YALE L.J. 1175 (1969).
2 G. Marcus, The Public Regulation of Drugs, Library of Congress Legislative Reference Serv-
ce, 1968, at 7. Elixir of Sulfanilamide was a solution of sulfanilamide in diethylene glycol. Although
the substance resulted in many deaths, it became the subject of governmental action only because
the term "elixir" implied that it was in an alcoholic solution.
3id. at 16.
' Although there are approximately 1,200 manufacturers of "drugs and medicines," the industry
ranks 313th in concentration of shares in the industrial market held by the large enterprises.
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ing the lives and well-being of so many people, there will always be a need
for governmental regulation.
This Comment deals with regulation of all phases of the industry, from
production to distribution of drug substances. However, it is not a study
of regulation itself, but rather is a survey and analysis of several means
used to enforce governmental regulation. It is appropriate at this point to
observe that existing law is presently the subject of many rather signifi-
cant changes. Several proposals for modern drug legislation are now before
Congress,' one of which, S. 3246,6 was passed by the Senate on January
28, 1970. That proposal, discussed below, provides for the supplementa-
tion and revision of major concepts under existing law, particularly the
classification of drugs for purposes of regulation. Although it proposes to
repeal many provisions now dealing with narcotics, marijuana, and depres-
sant and stimulant drugs, it leaves substantially in force existing pro-
visions for drugs not falling into any of these categories.
I. THE ENFORCEMENT PATTERN
In 1938, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,'
which remains today the basis for governmental regulation of the drug
industry. The Act provides for several enforcement measures, each of
which is designed to satisfy the need for enforcement of the Act in a
specific situation. The first enforcement measure is the authorization of
criminal penalties for violation of the Act.' These penalties will not be
discussed below, because the complex and distinct problems raised by crimi-
nal punishment deserve separate and exhaustive discussion. The second
means of enforcing the Act is the power of injunction.! This power, which
prior to 1938 generally was not available to the Government, was con-
sidered to be one of the most important enforcement powers granted by
Congress." Third, the 1938 Act carried forward from prior legislation,1
Moreover, it has been found that no one company accounts for as much as 7% of total prescription
sales. Key Facts About the Drug Industry, Pharm. Mfg. Ass'n Pub. (1968).
' Although Congress presently is considering many proposals with respect to drugs, three bills
deal with a major revision of federal drug laws: (1) S. 1895, introduced by Senator Dodd on
Apr. 18, 1969; (2) S. 2590, introduced by Senator Moss on July 10, 1969; and (3) S. 2637, in-
troduced by the late Senator Dirksen on July 16, 1969 (commonly called the Administration Bill).
S. 1895 and S. 2637 were the most significant pieces of proposed legislation aimed at major re-
structuring of the law. In the Senate all three bills were referred to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee. That Committee incorporated provisions from S. 1895 and S. 2637, and on Dec. 16, 1969,
reported a clean bill, S. 3246. On Jan. 28, 1970, that bill passed the Senate by an 82-0 roll-call
vote. In the House of Representatives a dispute over committee jurisdiction on the bill resulted
in the bill's being split into two bills, each covering a part of what was formerly S. 3246. H.R.
13472, covering only the narcotic drug aspects of the Administration Bill, was referred to the
House Ways and Means Committee. H.R. 13473, covering depressants, stimulants, and hallucino-
gens, was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
6S. 3246, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
721 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as Act, or 1938 Act].
8 ld. § 333.
9Id. § 332.
"°Current Legislation, Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 13 ST. JOHN's L. Rnv. 425,
434-35 (1939); Lee, Enforcement Provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 6 LAW &
CONTEMP. 'PRoB. 70, 85 (1939); Ohi, New Food and Drug Legislation, 4 JOHN MARSHALL L.Q. 1,
9-10 (1938).
"Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 10, 34 Star. 771.
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and from the procedure traditionally available in admiralty," the power
to seize certain property posing a threat to the safety of the public in
violation of the Act."a Fourth, a provision was included for inspection of
certain establishments and property subject to the Act. 4 This provision
was subsequently amended" and supplemented by administrative regula-
tions" to insure that the Government could stay well informed about the
operations of persons subject to the Act. The inspection power is at the
same time a type of regulation, an enforcement procedure, and a measure
aiding the utilization of other enforcement powers. Because of its many
uses, the power of inspection has come to be considered one of the most
valuable of governmental powers for regulation of the industry. One
additional enforcement power discussed below is the administrative sub-
pena.' Although presently it finds little direct application in regulation of
the drug industry, the subpena merits attention here because of its po-
tential value in proposed legislation.
II. INJUNCTION
Present Law. Included in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938 is section 332," providing for injunction of violations of the Act.
Specifically, section 332 grants jurisdiction to federal district courts to
restrain violations of certain provisions of section 331. Moreover, section
332 provides that upon trial for violation of an injunction or restraining
order, an accused may demand trial by jury." The principal violations of
section 331 subject to injunction are:
1. Adulteration or misbanding of any drug;
2. Introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce
of an adulterated or misbranded drug;
3. Failure to permit access to or copying of any record as required by
section 373 (carriers and receivers or possessors of drugs in inter-
state commerce) ;
4. Refusal to permit inspection as authorized by section 374;
5. Manufacture of adulterated or misbranded drugs in any territory;
6. Doing of certain acts relating to the making of counterfeit drugs;
7. Failure to register under section 360;
8. Handling of a stimulant or depressant drug as not authorized under
section 360a (a) (person not permitted to do so, or not properly
registered), failure to make, keep, or allow inspection of records or
premises in accordance with section 360a.'
When the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act became effective, it
" Lee, supra note 10, at 80.
"321 U.S.C. § 334 (1964).
14 Id. § 374.
"5Act of Oct. 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 201 (a), 76 Stat. 792.
."See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 1.700, 85.1-29 (1970).
1721 U.S.C. § 337 (1964).
'1id. 5 332.
"Id. 5 332(b).
"0Other acts are prohibited by id. § 331, but they are not relevant to this discussion.
[Vol. 24
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was thought that the newly authorized injunctive power would have
significant effect in enforcement of the Act. 1 Prior to 1938, without
specific statutory authority, courts were reluctant to enjoin acts which
also could constitute crimes." However, the basis for this judicial reluc-
tance, the time-honored maxim that "equity will not enjoin a crime,"
finds no application where injunction is authorized by statute.' Moreover,
under such a statute there need be no showing of "immediate and irre-
parable injury." Under section 332, no allegation must be made other
than a showing of "cause" for issuance of an injunction-in other words,
an allegation that the Act has been violated and that injunctive relief is
otherwise appropriate.'
The advantages of injunctive power are several.' First, the injunction
may allow testing of cases which otherwise might not present a "case or
controversy" cognizable by the courts. By co-operating and using an in-
junction proceeding, an alleged violator of the Act and the Government
may obtain judicial review of an administrative "decision." 7 Second, an
injunction proceeding has the advantage of speed. Because a jury is not
required in a proceeding to obtain an injunction,8 such a suit may find a
preferred position on the docket. The speed with which an injunction is
obtainable may serve in some instances to protect the public from the
movement of unsafe drugs in commerce-which may occur during the
pendency of a criminal prosecution. In addition, the injunction permits
an alleged violator of the Act to appear in court before action is taken,
unlike the situation occurring in condemnation proceedings. Because of
this fact, the injunction is potentially valuable in allowing a dispute
between an alleged violator and the Government to be settled in court
with a minimum of injury to the violator. Again in contrast to a con-
demnation proceeding, where the alleged violator's product may deteriorate
during the course of the proceedings, and, even in the case of a judgment
favorable to the violator, leave him without recourse for storage costs,
the injunction proceeding allows quick settlement of the question. As
originally enacted in 1938, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provided
2t See note 10 supra.
"
5Developments, Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REV. 994, 1013 (1965).
' F.D. CosM. L. REP. 5 2201 (1969); Developments, Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REV. 994,
1016 (1965); Note, Statutory Injunction as an Enforcement Weapon of Federal Agencies, 57
YALE L.J. 1023, 1026 (1948).
' Where a statute authorizes an injunction against certain conduct, a showing of "irreparable
injury" is not required unless the statute itself imposes such a limitation upon injunctive relief.
SEC v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937); Conway v. Mississippi State Bd. of Health, 252 Miss.
315, 173 So. 2d 412 (1965); Montana Milk Control Bd. v. Rehberg, 141 Mont. 149, 376 P.2d
508 (1962).
" See Note, supra note 23, at 1027. However, the elements necessary beyond evidence of viola-
tion of the Act are not clear. See F.D. CosM. L. REP. 5 2201 (1969); United States v. Lazere,
56 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Iowa 1944).
"See generally H.R. REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
"
7 Abbot Labs. v. Celabreeze, 352 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1965). Abbot was reversed, however, by
the Supreme Court in a decision which seems to broaden pre-enforcement review of administrative
regulations. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). See also Developments, Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1005, 1111 (1967).
" Because an action to obtain an injunction is equitable in nature, there is no right to trial
by jury. United States v. White County Bridge Comm'n, 275 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
sub noam. Clippinger v. United States, 364 U.S. 818 (1960).
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for seizure only in cases of adulteration or misbranding." Accordingly, the
injunction assumed great importance with respect to enforcement of other
provisions of the Act. Moreover, movement in interstate commerce was,
and is, a prerequisite to seizure in cases of adulteration or misbrandingY
The injunction serves to fill this gap in governmental seizure power."
Although amendments to the 1938 Act changed these situations by broad-
ening the seizure power,"2 the injunction clearly has not been rendered
obsolete. Finally, as a practical matter the injunction has potential value
to the Government simply as a threat against violation of the Act. Al-
though the risk exists that the violator may continue to commit prohibited
acts after an injunction is obtained, contempt proceedings provided by
the Act can be quite severe.
Despite the apparently overwhelming advantages of injunction, the
power is not without its practical disadvantages. First, it seems clear that
application of the injunction power is limited. It can serve no valuable
purpose with respect to past violations of the Act, or with respect to situa-
tions beyond the control of the violator. Thus, after a shipment of po-
tentially unsafe drugs leaves the hands of the manufacturer and reaches
the consumer, an injunction may have little significance. Moreover, as sug-
gested above, an injunction reaches violators of the Act, but does not
neecssarily reach the violation itself. Even if an injunction is obtained,
drugs which are the subject of the violation may have continued to move
during the course of the proceeding. Finally, it can be extremely difficult
to police a decree of injunction. If the violator is not adequately apprehen-
sive of contempt penalties, the violation may continue.
Several procedural aspects of the injunction may also be thought of as
disadvantageous. First, the district court on petition for injunction must
make its findings of fact explicit.' It seems clear that this requirement may
work to the disadvantage of whichever party succeeds in the hearing for
injunction, because the explicit findings of fact may afford a better op-
portunity for reversal of the court's decree. Second, the injunction
authorized by the statute, like all injunctions, is within the discretion of
the court. The Government assumes the risk that factors aside from the
alleged violation may cause its petition for injunction to fail," and accord-
ingly, cause the time spent in seeking the injunction to be wasted. In a
situation where the Government cannot afford this risk, the advantage of
2'9 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1964), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (2) (Supp. I, 1965).
2021 U.S.C. § 334 (1964).
S'See United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 345 F.2d 864 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 918
(1965). Vilasafe involved seizure of goods ultimately found not to be misbranded or adulterated,
and thus not properly subject to seizure. An injunction in the same situation would have been
appropriate and enforceable.
'221 U.S.C. § 334(a)(2) (Supp. I, 1965).
22The penalty for contempt is limited to $1,000 in the case of natural persons, but no limi-
tation on the penalty for contempt is prescribed for corporate offenders. 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1964)
governs the procedure and practice in criminal contempts. See note 52 infra.
'FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
s5See note 42 infra. Cf. United States v. Article of Drug, etc., 362 F.2d 923, 928 (3d Cir.
1966): "[Issuance of an injunction] is in the broadest sense for the discretion of the trial court
which is best qualified to form a judgment as to the likelihood of a repetition of the offense."
See Hygrade Food Prods. Corp. v. United States, 160 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1947).
[Vol. 24
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seizure or other enforcement measures seems clear. Finally, if the injunc-
tion is granted but subsequently violated, the Government may be forced
to present its case in contempt proceedings rather than in proceedings for
violation of the Act. From a purely strategical point of view, such a situa-
tion must be undesirable to the Government.
Proposed Legislation. Under what appears to be the most significant
piece of proposed legislation, S. 3246, existing provisions for injunction
would remain substantially in force. However, it is important to observe
that S. 3246 is, as its title implies, a bill for the regulation of "Controlled
Dangerous Substances."' The effect which it will have is upon the pro-
visions of existing law dealing with narcotic, depressant, stimulant, and
hallucinogenic drugs. 7 For the most part, as has been observed, section
331 of the Act, which enumerates acts subject to injunction under section
332, deals with drugs other than narcotics, depressants, stimulants, and
hallucinogens. However, section 331 (q), which prohibits certain acts with
respect to depressant or stimulant drugs, would be repealed by the pro-
posed legislation.'8 Under S. 3246, section 705"0 provides for injunctive
relief against violations of the proposed Controlled Dangerous Substances
Act, and, accordingly, would accomplish with respect to a broadened class
of dangerous drugs the same general effect now accomplished by section
332 with respect to stimulants and depressants. However, there are some
rather interesting distinctions between the two injunction provisions.
Section 705 differs first, of course, to the extent that substantive regula-
tory requirements (and hence the prohibited acts) of S. 3246 differ from
regulation under present law. The only meaningful comparison which can
be made with respect to violations subject to injunction is between section
331 (q) (the basis for injunction relating to stimulants and depressants
under present law) and title V of S. 3246 (prohibited acts subject to in-
junction under section 705). With respect to stimulant and depressant
drugs, an injunction basically may be obtained under section 332 to en-
join certain violations of section 360a:
Section 360a(a) prohibits the manufacturing, compounding, or
processing of stimulant or depressant drugs by anyone other than
certain registered (under section 360) persons, and certain medical,
quasi-medical, scientific, or supply persons.
Section 360a(b) prohibits the sale, delivery, or other disposal of
depressant or stimulant drugs by anyone other than persons enumer-
ated in section 360a(a), or by certain carriers or warehousemen.
Section 360a(c) prohibits possession of stimulant or depressant
drugs (other than for personal use) by anyone other than persons
enumerated in section 360a(a) or (b).
Section 360 (e) prohibits the filling or refilling of prescriptions for
s6 116 CONG. REc. 764 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1970).
37 S. 3246 is captioned: "A Bill to protect the public health and safety by amending the nar-
cotic, depressant, stimulant, and hallucinogenic drug laws, and for other purposes." id.




depressant or stimulant drugs after a certain time following prescrip-
tion, or for more than a specified number of times during that period.
Section 360a(d) requires that all persons authorized under section
360a(a) to "handle" depressant or stimulant drugs must keep records
of all contacts with such drugs, including the amount and the dispo-
sition of drugs "handled." It further provides for inspection of records
and premises subject to the section.
It is clear that under section 332, an injunction is authorized to prevent
violations in nearly all phases of "traffic" in stimulants and depressants-
from manufacture to final prescription.
Section 705 of S. 3246 is seemingly broader than the injunctive power
now applicable with respect to stimulant and depressant drugs, because
it provides for injunction of all violations of the proposed Controlled
Dangerous Substances Act. Although this would seem to permit injunc-
tion of certain acts (or omissions) not categorized as "prohibited acts," in
reality the apparent breadth may be of little significance. Most of the
provisions of the bill for which injunctive relief would be appropriate
are made prohibited acts under title V. Effectively, S. 3246 would prohibit,
and thus permit injunction for the commission of, all acts with respect to
controlled dangerous substances which section 331 (q) now prohibits with
respect to stimulants and depressants. However, unlike provisions of the
present law, the injunction power is expanded by the requirement for
registration of all persons "handling" controlled dangerous substances.
Moreover, the proposed legislation would authorize injunction of (1) im-
portation, (2) exportation, (3) counterfeiting, (4) manufacture outside
the United States with intent to unlawfully import, and (5) "handling"
in a manner not authorized by the registration or license obtained, of cer-
tain classes of controlled dangerous substances.'0 Thus, although some sig-
nificant controls for which injunction is available would be added by
S. 3246, the practical application of the injunction power would be ex-
panded principally by virtue of the inclusion of additional "substances"
in the regulatory scheme of the bill.
Another interesting distinction between the injunction provided under
section 332 of the present law, and that provided in section 705 of S. 3246
is seen in the language of the latter. Section 705 does not adopt the "for
cause shown" language of section 332. " That phrase has been thought to
instruct the court that an injunction is not to be issued as a matter of
right upon a showing of past conduct by the violator.' Although it is clear
that no showing of "irreparable injury" is required,' it appears that under
section 332 evidence of violations of the Act may not by itself constitute
cause for issuance of the injunction." Section 705, which dispenses with the
"1Id. § 501, 502, 503.
41 "The district courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown, ...
to restrain violations of section 331 of this title, except paragraphs (e), (f), and (h)-(j) of said
section." 21 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1964).
4'2 A. HERRICK, FOOD REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE 1232 (1947). See note 35 suPra.
43See note 24 supra.
"See note 41 supra.
[Vol. 24
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"for cause shown" provision, would seem to authorize an injunction upon a
showing that the proposed legislation has been violated-i.e., as a matter of
right. However, it is unclear whether the proposed section will accomplish
this purpose. Historically, courts have been reluctant to abandon equitable
principles governing the issuance of injunctions.' In the absence of evi-
dence tending to show present or future violation of the Act, injunctive
relief may be considered unnecessary and inappropriate, and accordingly
be withheld."
Other language also is omitted from section 705 of S. 3246 which now
exists in section 332 of the present law. Section 332 (b) provides:
In case of violation of an injunction or restraining order issued under this
section, which also constitutes a violation of this chapter, trial shall be by the
court, or upon demand of the accused, by a jury. Such trial shall be conducted
in accordance with the practice and procedure applicable in the case of
proceedings subject to the provisions of section 387 of Title 28, as amended.
[Emphasis added.]
The provision for trial by jury was probably included to answer possible
constitutional objections to the degree of protection available to an accused
in contempt proceedings where the act of contempt also may be a crime.
However, although the section makes it clear that a jury may be de-
manded in cases where the contempt also is a crime, it seems to admit the
argument that if violation of the injunction does not also constitute a
45 In Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944), the Court considered the question of whether a
lower court was vested with the discretion to withhold injunctive relief under the Emergency
Price Control Act, ch. 26, § 205, 56 Stat. 33 (1942). That section provides:
Whenever in the judgment of the administrator any person has engaged or is about
to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of
any provision of section 4 of this act . . . he may make application to the appropriate
court for an order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing com-
pliance with such provision, and upon a showing by the administrator that such
person has engaged in or is about to engage in any such acts or practices a permanent
or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted without
bond. [Emphasis added.]
Upholding the lower court's reluctance to grant the injunction as a matter of right, the Supreme
Court said:
We do not stop to compare the provisions of section (925) with the requirements
of other federal statutes governing administrative agencies which, it is said, make it
mandatory that those agencies take action when certain facts are shown to exist. We
are dealing here with the requirements of equity practice with a background of sev-
eral hundred years of history. Only the other day we stated that 'An appeal to the
equity jurisdiction conferred on federal district courts is an appeal to the sound dis-
cretion which guides the determinations of courts of equity.' Meredith v. City of
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 . . . The historic injunctive process was designed to
deter, not to punish. The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the
Chancellor to do equity and to mold each decree to the necessities of the particular
case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and
practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation
between the public interest and private needs as well as between competing private
claims. We do not believe that such a major departure from that long tradition as
is here proposed should be lightly implied.
321 U.S. at 329.
4 See note 42 supra. In SEC v. Mono Kearsage Consol. Mining Co., 167 F. Supp. 248 (D. Utah
1958), the court recognized the rule anounced in Hecht v. Bowles (see note 45 supra), and de-
termined that even if an injunction statute is mandatory in form, providing that an injunction
"shall" issue upon a proper showing, issuance of the injunction is not obligatory on the court,
and equitable principles should guide the court's granting or refusal.
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violation of the Act, no right to trial by jury is available. Section 705 of
S. 3246 does not place this condition on the right to trial by jury, but
provides simply that where an injunction is violated, the accused in con-
tempt proceedings may demand trial by jury. In so doing, section 705
avoids this objectionable feature of the present law.
One recent case, Bloom v. Illinois,4 may have a significant effect on the
right to deny an alleged violator of an injunction decree the right to trial
by jury where the violation does not also constitute a violation of the Act.
In Bloom the defendant was convicted for criminal contempt and sen-
tenced to two years' imprisonment for attempting to have a falsely pre-
pared will admitted to probate. Although the "offense" which the defend-
ant committed possibly could have constituted the crime of forgery, he
was not tried for that crime. Rather, the trial court chose to treat the
act as contempt of court. The conviction for contempt was affirmed by the
Illinois supreme court," and thereafter the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari." The Court had little difficulty in characterizing the
offense as criminal, rather than civil, contempt. Although this characteriza-
tion has sometimes proven difficult to make,"0 the Court announced what
appears to be the recognized definition of criminal contempt: a "public
wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. ' '"s The Court
determined that criminal contempt is indistinguishable from ordinary
criminal conviction, whether or not the contempt also constitutes a viola-
tion of other criminal law. It held that where the criminal contempt
constitutes a "serious" offense, the right to trial by jury must be afforded
the defendant. In so doing, the Court left intact the power of courts to
punish contempt for petty offenses without a jury." Although the Court
did not make explicit the meaning of "serious" offense, it indicated that
the proper test is the gravity of the penalty imposed. Nothing in the
Court's opinion suggests whether large fines could constitute "serious"
penalties, but such a conclusion would seem appropriate. In cases where
no maximum penalty is provided by law for the offense of criminal con-
te~npt, a the Court determined that the punishment actually imposed should
47391 U.S. 194 (1968).
4 People v. Bloom, 35 Ill. 2d 255, 220 N.E.2d 475 (1966).
49386 U.S. 1003 (1967).
s See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 227 F.2d 844 (9th Cit. 1955); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co.,
194 U.S. 324 (1904).
5'391 U.S. at 201.
5221 U.S.C. § 332(b) (1964) provides that contempt proceedings are to be governed by the
practice and procedure of proceedings under Clayton Act ch. 323, 5 22, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
Although the contempt provisions of § 22 of the Clayton Act were repealed by enactment of 18
U.S.C. § 402 (1964) (Contempts Constituting Crimes), one case prior to that repeal made clear
that not all procedural aspects of the Clayton Act were to apply. United States v. Dean Rubber
Co., 72 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Mo. 1947). 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1964) now provides basically two
things: (1) A limitation for fines which may be imposed on natural persons, and (2) by reference
to 18 U.S.C. § 3691 (1964), trial by jury at the request of the accused if the contempt also con-
stitutes an independent crime. Both § 402 and § 3691 exempt from these provisions certain con-
tempts committed in the presence of the court. The Court in Bloom recognized these exemptions
as being historically acceptable under the Constitution, and thus found it unnecessary to carve out
a specific exception to the rule which it announced.
" Under 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1964) no limitation is prescribed for corporate offenders, or for
contempts committed in the presence of the court.
[Vol. 24
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be scrutinized to test the seriousness of the conviction." Although the
decision in Bloom is silent as to other constitutional protections which may
be available in the trial of a defendant for criminal contempt, the stage
seems set for the finding of additional protections." The effect which these
developments may have on contempt proceedings under section 332 seems
clear.
Another distinction in the language of the two injunction sections is
in their provisions for the procedure to be followed in contempt proceed-
ings. A contempt proceeding under section 332 (b) is governed by Rule
42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That section provides, as
does section 332 itself, for a jury trial as discussed above. It also provides
for a limitation on the fine which may be imposed on a natural person.
However, it could be argued that the incorporation of this provision of
the Criminal Code does not have the effect of making other sections of
that Code applicable to contempt proceedings. " Under decisions holding
that contempt proceedings are not criminal in nature unless the con-
temptuous conduct also is a crime,"7 it would seem that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure could govern the general procedure of trial for contempt.'
Indeed, section 705 of S. 3246 expressly provides for the application of
those Rules. However, despite these provisions, the decision in Bloom may
require substantial deviation from civil procedure in many instances.
III. INSPECTION
Present Law. Necessary for the enforcement of drug laws and regulations
is the authority of the Government to inform itself of the practices and
operations of persons "handling"5 9 drugs. Accordingly, the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act provides for two types of inspections. The first is the
right of government officials to inspect records or documents which are
required by the Act for the express purpose of aiding in the enforcement
of drug laws.60 However, few questions are raised with respect to this
sort of inspection and it merits no extensive comment here. The second
type of inspection is authorized by sections 360, 360a, 372, 373, and 374."
Inspections of this type extend to the physical operations of drug "estab-
lishments" and property closely related to the handling of drugs, includ-
"However, this procedure would seem to be undesirable, because it may require many reversals
of convictions and burdensome retrials.
" For example, it is clear that in a trial for criminal contempt the defendant must be proved
guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt." Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
Moreover, he should be entitled to counsel [Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925)], notice,
a reasonable time to prepare a defense, bail, and an impartial judge. FED. R. CRrM. P. 42.
5 Cf. United States v. Dean Rubber Co., 72 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Mo. 1947).
" See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924); State v. Greenwood, 63 N.M.
156, 315 P.2d 223 (1957).
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 81.
" The term "handling" is not used in either existing law or the proposed legislation. It is em-
ployed in this Comment only for simplification. Provisions under the proposed legislation and ex-
isting law differ from each other in the terminology used to describe what is here labeled "hand-
ling." That difference, though not material for purposes of this Comment, should be observed.
6021 U.S.C. §§ 355(j), 357(g) (1964), 360b (Supp. IV, 1968).61
Id. §§ 360 (1964), 360a (Supp. I, 1965), 373, 374 (1964).
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ing certain records and documents not necessarily required to be kept
under the Act.
In aid of understanding the scope and operation of the inspection
power, it is necessary to review the provisions of the sections mentioned
above. Section 360 provides basically a registration requirement for cer-
tain establishments handling drugs. Subsection (h) makes every registered
establishment subject to inspection at least once during every two-year
period following registration. Section 360a prohibits the handling of
stimulant or depressant drugs by all but certain enumerated classes of
persons. Subsection (d) of this section provides for both types of inspec-
tions mentioned above: (1) inspections of records or documents required
to be kept under the section by persons handling stimulant or depressant
drugs, and (2) inspection of the premises and "all things therein" bear-
ing on a violation of section 360a or section 331 (q), in order to verify
the records required to be kept under the section. It should be noted that
the authority under section 360a to inspect the premises is rather re-
stricted in theory, even though it may not be so in practice." The inspec-
tion authorized should be limited by the purpose of verifying records
required to be kept under the Act. Those records pertain principally to
the quantity and disposition of stimulant and depressant drugs handled
by the establishment. Accordingly, section 360a does not grant authority
to conduct a general inspection of an establishment processing stimulant
or depressant drugs. It should also be noted that the language of the sec-
tion prohibits inspection of (1) financial data, (2) sales data other than
shipment data, (3) pricing data, (4) personnel data, or (5) research data."
Section 374 provides the basic limitations on, and procedures to be fol-
lowed in, inspections authorized under section 360. The basic provisions
of this statute may be summarized as follows. First, with the exception of
establishments handling prescription drugs, the inspection is limited to
establishments handling drugs which have been or will be moved in inter-
state commerce. Second, the section provides that although the inspection
may extend to all things bearing on whether a violation of the Act has
been committed if the establishment handles prescription drugs, the five
classes of data exempted under section 360a also are exempted from in-
spection under section 374."' Section 374 does not expressly delineate the
scope of the inspection of an establishment which produces neither pre-
scription drugs (covered by section 374 itself) nor stimulant or depres-
"'The inspection authorized under § 360 is broader than that authorized under § 360a. Al-
though some establishments under the latter are not subject to inspection under § 360, there are
instances where inspection is authorized under either. Accordingly, even though an inspection of
an establishment handling stimulant or depressant drugs might exceed the scope authorized by
§ 360a, the inspection could be justified under § 360. This situation also occurs with respect to
other sections. Cf. United States v. Herold, 136 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1955) (§5 373, 374).
"These five exemptions under § 360a(d) (2) (B) apparently are qualified by the language of5 374(a). The latter section provides that in the case of Prescriptionl drug handlers, inspection
may extend to personnel data of technical and professional personnel, and to research data con-
cerning certain new drugs and antibiotics. It is not clear whether the reference to § 374(a) by
§ 360a(d) (2) (B) should incorporate these qualifications unconditionally, or only with respect to
prescription drug handlers.
64 See note 63 supra.
[Vol. 24
COMMENTS
sant drugs (covered by section 360a). Although the inspection of such
an establishment reasonably could extend to all things bearing on a viola-
tion of the Act, it is arguable that the language of the section excludes
from inspection records, files, papers, processes, and controls, which are
expressly included in inspections of establishments producing prescrip-
tion, depressant, or stimulant drugs.' Third, the section exempts from
inspection, on account of their handling of prescription drugs, the follow-
ing entities: (1) pharmacies, (2) practitioners, and (3) researchers. Be-
cause these entities are exempted from the inspection authorized for hand-
lers of prescription drugs, two conclusions seem possible. First, there is a
significant difference between the authorized scope of inspection of hand-
lers of prescription drugs and of handlers of non-prescription drugs.
Second, pharmacies, physicians, and researchers are not exempt from all
inspection, but only that inspection authorized for handlers of prescription
drugs.
Before discussing some of the problems which these inspection provi-
sions have raised, two other important sections dealing with inspection
power should be mentioned. First, because the movement of drugs in inter-
state commerce is an essential element in the right to inspect all but
establishments handling prescription, depressant, or stimulant drugs, it is
very important that a means for determining this movement be available.
Section 373 accomplishes this by requiring all carriers engaged in interstate
commerce, and all persons receiving drugs in interstate commerce, to per-
mit designated government officials access to, and the right to copy, all
records showing the movement of the drugs in interstate commerce.
Second, section 372 provides for the delegation of authority to conduct
cexaminations and investigations." Under this section, the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare may delegate authority to conduct inspec-
tions to personnel of other federal departments, and to properly commis-
sioned state and municipal personnel."7
The power of what may be called "factory" inspection has raised prob-
lems since enactment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in
1938. The first case to test the original statutory sche~ne for "compulsory"
inspections was United States v. Cardiff."s In that case the Supreme Court
65 See United States v. Crescent-Kelvan, 164 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. Herold,
136 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1955). Each of these cases was decided prior to amendment of § 374
to permit compulsory "factory" inspections. Act of Aug. 7, 1953, ch. 350, § 1, 67 Star. 476,
amending Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, § 704, 52 Star. 1047, codified as 21
U.S.C. § 374 (1964). However, in each case the court found that authority to enter the establish-
ment (though with the permission of the owner because of the language of the statute at that
time) included authority to inspect records only expressly authorized to be inspected in the case
of prescription drug handlers. However, a contrary view has been expressed. Aarons, Factory In-
spection, 22 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 407, 408 (1967).
" This authority may also be derived from § 374 if the person having possession of the in-
formation also is subject to that section. See United States v. Herold, 136 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y.
1955).
67 The need for state and federal co-operation has been well recognized. Rosenthal, Proposals
for Dangerous Drug Legislation, in PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE 80, 94 (1967).
See also Smith, New Ideas in Cooperation, 24 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J. 90 (1969).
6s344 U.S. 174 (1952).
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interpreted two provisions of the Act. Section 374 originally provided that
inspection of premises could be made at reasonable times after making a
request and obtaining permission from the owner. 9 Section 331 (f), how-
ever, prohibited "refusal to permit entry or inspection as authorized by
section 374 of this title."7 The Court found the two sections irreconcilable
and held section 331 (f) void for vagueness. However, in 1953, an amend-
ment to the Act became effective providing for the compulsory inspection
which exists under present law."
The question involved in Cardiff was rather narrow. No serious issue
was raised with respect to the inspection itself, or with respect to the right
of compulsory inspection if the statute were not vague. Subsequently, how-
ever, the theory of compulsory inspection caused serious constitutional
objections. It was urged before Congress,"' prior to the amendment of
section 374 to provide compulsory inspection, and later in the courts in
several cases involving local health inspections, ' that warrantless inspec-
tions were unconstitutional under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 4
However, these objections apparently were answered on the grounds that
such administrative inspections were constitutionally permissible either
under the "police power" of the states (where the inspection was by state
authorities), or because they were inherently "reasonable" and hence not
subject to the requirements of the fourth amendment.' Recently, two cases
decided by the Supreme Court have made clear that neither of these
grounds justifies failure to comply with basic requirements applicable to
searches and seizures.
In Camara v. Municipal Court"6 an inspector of the San Francisco De-
partment of Public Health attempted to enter the apartment of appellant
to conduct a routine building inspection as authorized by a municipal
housing code." On that and subsequent occasions, the appellant refused to
admit the inspector, purportedly because the inspector did not possess
a warrant for search of the premises. Appellant was thereafter arrested
and charged with refusal to permit a lawful inspection authorized by
the municipal code. Filing a writ of prohibition, appellant contended that
"5Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, S 704, 52 Stat. 1057, as amended, 21
U.S.C. § 374 (1964).
7021 U.S.C. § 331(f) (1964).
7' Act of Aug. 7, 1953, ch. 350, § 1, 67 Stat. 476, amending Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
of 1938, ch. 675, S 704, 52 Stat. 1057, codified as 21 U.S.C. § 374 (1964).7
2H.R. RE. No. 708, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1953).
73Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Givner v.
State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956); City of St. Louis v. Evans, 337 S.W.2d 948 (Mo.
1960). Objections to compulsory inspections are also discussed in Developments, The Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 67 HARv. L. REV. 632, 690 (1954). See cases cited in id. at n.466.
74 U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV.
' It is clear that the fourth amendment protection extends only to "unreasonable" searches.
However, the "reasonableness" test has been employed in different ways by the Court, including
the interpretation that a search is presumptively unreasonable if not authorized by a valid search
warrant. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
76 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
7 SAN FRANCISCO CAL., MUrN. CODE, S 503, as quoted in 387 U.S. at 526: "Authorized em-
ployees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the performance
of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable
times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them
by the Municipal Code."
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the search authorized by the ordinance was not constitutionally permissible
under the fourth and fourteenth amendments because it was not pursuant
to a warrant and was not conditioned upon probable cause to believe that
a violation of the housing code had occurred. The Supreme Court agreed,
holding that the nature of the "search" did not justify abandonment of
basic constitutional rights. The Court was not persuaded by the argument
that because administrative searches are not effected for the purpose of
finding evidence of criminal conduct, they may avoid the fourth amend-
ment prohibition of warrantless searches. The Court appeared to find that
the privacy of a person's home is protected by the fourth amendment
whether or not the search is to find evidence of criminal behavior."8 How-
ever, it observed that many regulatory inspections entailed the threat of
criminal prosecution either on the finding of a violation during the in-
spection, or upon the refusal of an occupant to permit the search. The
Court also rejected the contention that most ordinances or laws authorizing
regulatory inspections are written with sufficient safeguards against abuse,
and that to require prior issuance of a warrant would either prevent valu-
able inspections or debase the warrant procedure. It determined that an
occupant is not fairly apprised of such limitations on the authority of
inspectors, and accordingly has no way of knowing whether the inspec-
tion is being properly conducted. Moreover, the Court found that the need
to interpose a neutral magistrate between a person subject to administra-
tive inspection and the administrative agent is no less urgent than the need
to interpose a magistrate between a criminal suspect and the police. Finally,
the Court determined that warrantless investigations are not justified on
the ground of public policy. It found that public interest justifies only
the investigation itself, not the failure to obtain a warrant.
Despite the Court's emphatic pronouncement that a warrantless in-
spection is not constitutionally permissible, it apparently agreed that rou-
tine inspections would be impeded by requiring the same degree of "prob-
able cause" as is required in criminal investigations. Probable cause, the
Court observed, is determined by focusing upon the governmental interest
which allegedly justifies the intrusion. In the case of regulatory inspec-
tions, the Court determined that the reasonableness of the need to inspect
should govern. It recognized the value of periodic inspections without
knowledge of the existence of substandard conditions, and held that the
reasonableness of instituting such an inspection depends on factors such as
the passage of time since the last inspection, the nature of the building,
and the condition of the area to be inspected."5 Accordingly, the Court
protected the power of government officials to conduct preventative in-
spections as part of a program of routine investigation. It is significant
that the Court's decision, however, does not affect the right of govern-
78 ,It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected





mental officers to conduct warrantless investigations and inspections in
emergency situations."0
On the same day, the Court decided a case with similar facts. See v. City
of Seattle"5 involved an attempted fire inspection of a commercial ware-
house. Relying on its decision in Camara, the Court held that the regula-
tory inspection of commercial property, as well as the inspection of private
houses, is presumptively unreasonable under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments if conducted without a warrant.
The effect which these decisions must have on inspections under section
374 is clear. However, although the decisions could even affect the validity
of that section, the Food and Drug Administration has announced that
"inspection warrants" will be obtained in all cases where voluntary in-
spection is refused."
Proposed Legislation. Section 70383 of S. 3246, which authorizes adminis-
trative inspections, would supplement existing provisions for inspection
in accordance with the proposed regulatory scheme for controlled danger-
ous substances. The section clearly reveals the effects of Camara and See,
and avoids many of the ambiguities and inconsistencies of present law
dealing with inspections. Under the bill, section 360a, which currently
authorizes inspections of establishments handling stimulant or depressant
drugs, would be repealed. 4 However, with the exception of minor con-
forming amendments, sections 360, 373, and 374 would remain in force.
Section 703 expressly provides for the issuance of administrative "in-
spection warrants" by state or federal courts. It requires a showing of
probable cause for the inspection, but significantly, defines the requisite
probable cause as "a valid public interest in the effective enforcement of
the act or regulations sufficient to justify administrative inspection of the
area, premises, building or conveyance in the circumstances specified in
the application for the warrant."' Before the decision in Camara, al-
though it would not then have been necessary, such an internal definition
of probable cause could have been of doubtful constitutional validity.
However, it is clear that Camara established for administrative inspections
a much less demanding type of probable cause than formerly thought
necessary to satisfy fourth amendment requirements. Accordingly, the
constitutionality of this "internally defined" probable cause seems beyond
question. Actually, section 703 goes beyond the requirements discussed in
Camara in providing for the manner of execution, the time of expiration,
and the procedure for return of the warrant.' The inspection authorized
80 "[N]othing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a war-
rant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations." Id. at 539.
"t 3 8 7 U.S. 541 (1967).
' F.D. CosM. L. REP. 5 2661.40 (1969); see H. TOULMIN, LAW OF FOOD, DRuGs, AND COS-
METICS § 37.5 (Supp. 1969).




5 id. § 703 (a) (1).
8 The warrant must direct that it be served during normal business hours; it must state the
grounds for its issuance, the identity of persons whose aflidavits support it, and the property to
be inspected. The warrant expires 10 days after issuance, and return must be made to a designated
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by section 703 extends to all "controlled premises," which are defined as:
(1) places where persons registered or exempt from registration are re-
quired to keep records, and (2) places where persons registered or exempt
from registration are permitted to handle controlled dangerous substances.
Although for most purposes this definition includes all places where inspec-
tion is necessary, it does not expressly authorize inspection of places required
to be registered which are in fact not registered. It would seem more appro-
priate to define "controlled premises" as "those places required to be regis-
tered under this act, whether actually registered or not, and those places
exempt from registration."
The scope of the inspection authorized under section 703 for "controlled
premises" extends to all things subject to inspection under present law
(in the case of prescription, depressant, or stimulant drugs). It also sub-
jects to inspection data concerning personnel and research, which are now
exempt from inspection. Finally, section 703 provides for inspections
without warrants in five specific situations." The most interesting provision
for warrantless inspection is section 703 (b) (4) (e), which provides that
such an inspection may be made "in all other situations where a warrant
is not constitutionally required." Although it may be doubtful that future
constitutional interpretation will expand rather than constrict the right
to make warrantless inspections, this provision has the desirable effect of
giving inspection agents all of the leeway constitutionally permissible.
One additional aspect of section 703 merits observation but no extensive
comment. Noticeably, section 703 does not require that the establishments
subject to inspection must be involved in interstate commerce. Although
this may significantly ease the Government's burden of proof in many
instances, it may not amount to a substantial extension of the inspection
power.
IV. SEIZURE
Present Law. As originally enacted in 1938, section 33488 carried forward
the basic provisions for seizure and condemnation of drugs which existed
under the 1906 Food and Drugs Act.' However, the 1938 Act incorporated
several major changes. First, it provided that in most situations only one
libel proceeding could be instituted against goods alleged to be misbranded.
Accordingly, it provided some measure of protection against costly and in-
convenient multiple seizure in many instances.9" Second, after amend-
magistrate, including an inventory of all property taken. Id. § 703 (a) (2). The mandatory ex-
piration avoids what may be a fourth amendment problem. See State v. Ferrigno, 5 Conn. Cir.
468, 256 A.2d 795 (1969).
87 Sec. 703 (b) (4) authorizes inspection without a warrant (including seizures of property):
(I) With consent of the owner or certain authorized agents; (2) In situations presenting imminent
danger to health or safety; (3) In the inspection of conveyances where there is reasonable cause
to believe that the mobility of the conveyance makes obtaining a warrant impracticable; (4) In
any other exceptional or emergency circumstance where the time or opportunity to apply for a
warrant is lacking; and (5) in all other situations where a warrant is not constitutionally required.
S. 3246, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 703 (b) (4) (a)-(e) (1969).
" Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, § 304, 52 Stat. 1044, as amended,
21 U.S.C. § 334 (Supp. I, 1965).
S9See note 11 supra.
"0 Under the Food and Drugs Act of 1906, when seizure was authorized the Government could
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ment,'" the Act broadened the power of seizure to apply to misbranded
or adulterated goods even after movement in interstate commerce. Third,
unlike the 1906 Act, section 334(a) provided for the removal of a libel
proceeding to a district of reasonable proximity to the personal defend-
ant's place of business. Fourth, the 1938 Act gave rise to differing interp-
retations of several acts constituting violation of the statute, and cor-
respondingly, broadened the reach of the seizure power."
In 1965, amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act significantly
broadened the libel, condemnation, and seizure power. What is now section
334 (a) (2) was added to the Act," providing for libel and condemnation
at any time of stimulant, depressant, and counterfeit drugs, or certain
equipment or containers used in their making or handling with respect to
which a prohibited act under sections 331(q) or 331(p) has occurred.
Accordingly, in the case of stimulant, depressant, or counterfeit drugs,
section 334(a) (2) dispenses with the requirement that the substances to
be seized must have moved in interstate commerce.
One important aspect relating to the sections above is the right of
executive seizure-the right to seize drugs prior to the institution of libel
proceedings. When section 334(a) (2) was added to the Act in 1965,
subsection (e) (5) was added to section 372 of the Act," authorizing
executive seizure of goods prior to institution of libel proceedings under
section 334(a) (2). Under subsection (e) (5), agents of the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs are authorized to make such a seizure
when they have "reasonable grounds" to believe that the goods are sub-
ject to seizure and condemnation under section 334(a) (2). There is no
corresponding authority for executive seizure of goods subject to libel and
condemnation under section 334(a) (1). Two important questions have
been raised with respect to executive seizure of misbranded or adulterated
drugs (i.e., those subject to libel and condemnation under section
334(a) (1)) .- First, can libel properly be instituted if the drugs are not
seize goods wherever found in interstate commerce. Persons whose property was thus seized could,
if they desired to defend the property in condemnation proceedings, be forced to defend numerous,
geographically separate, seizure actions. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act precluded mul-
tiple seizures in many situations, but did leave intact the Government's power to make such
seizures in specified instances involving flagrant violations of the Act or great public health haz-
ards. See A. HERRICK, supra note 42, at 1193.
0'21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (1) (Supp. I, 1965), amiending 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1964).
92The Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906 limited seizure to situations in which an article
was transported from one state to another for sale, or, having been transported, remained "un-
loaded, unsold, or in the original unbroken packages." Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915,
§ 10, 34 Stat. 771. It would appear that this limitation was imposed because of contemporary con-
stitutional construction, finding interstate commerce to end after breakage of the original package.
See Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S.
100 (1890). However, cases supporting this construction dealt with the question of where state
regulation could begin, and not with where federal regulation must end. Id. Accordingly, the limi-
tation on federal seizure jurisdiction, even under the 1906 Act, may not have been necessary.
" To the extent that enforcement powers depend on violation of the 1938 Act, the breadth
of such powers can only fully be seen in light of the acts proscribed and the elements necessary
to constitute a violation.
"Act of July 15, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74, § 6(a), 79 Stat. 232, anending 21 U.S.C. § 334
(1964).
9 Act of July 15, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74, § 8(a), 79 Star. 234, amending 21 U.S.C. § 372
(1964).
"See A. Herrick, supra note 42, at 1184.
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seized prior to the proceeding? Second, whether or not there is a require-
ment for prior seizure of the goods, is there any legal authority for execu-
tive seizure without process issued pursuant to libel proceedings? It appears
that both of these questions can be answered in the affirmative. Although
libel proceedings are basically actions in rem," which could indicate that
possession of the goods is a prerequisite to jurisdiction, it has been held
that a court acquires jurisdiction by the mere filing of the libel, even
though it can exercise its power only when the property to be libelled has
been seized.9' The question of necessity for seizure prior to institution of
a proceeding under section 334(a) (2) is raised in part by the language
in section 334 (b) dealing with procedure. That section provides that "the
procedure in cases arising under this section shall conform, as nearly as
may be, to the procedure in admiralty." Historically, admiralty procedure
required a prior attachment of goods to be libeled.9 However, in cases
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, this aspect of admiralty pro-
cedure is apparently found inapplicable."
Although it is not necessary that drugs subject to libel and condemna-
tion under section 334 (a) (1) be seized prior to the institution of proceed-
ings, it has been suggested that the power to do so exists. 1 First, it is said
that drugs being held or moving in violation of the Act may be char-
acterized as contraband."' Second, it has been thought that the right of
prior seizure under admiralty procedure indicates a corresponding right,
even if not a necessity, under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act." How-
ever, neither of these theories seems entirely satisfactory in light of Con-
gress' failure to provide explicitly for executive seizure in the case of
adulterated or misbranded drugs. In the case of seizures relating to stimu-
lant and depressant drugs, there can be no mistake about Congress' intent
to provide the power of executive seizure."'
97 Id.
"United States v. Capon Water Co., 30 F.2d 300 (E.D. Pa. 1929), dismissed sub nom. United
States v. 94 Dozen Bottles C.S. Water, 48 F.2d 378 (E.D. Pa. 1930), aff'd, 51 F.2d 913 (3d Cir.
1931); United States v. George Spraul & Co., 185 F. 405 (6th Cir. 1911). Both of these cases
were decided under the Food and Drugs Act of 1906. However, the issue apparently was not
thought to exist after enactment of the 1938 Act against such a background of judicial decision.
9See A. HERRICK, supra note 42, at 1184.
1"'See, e.g., 443 Cans of Frozen Egg Prod. v. United States, 226 U.S. 172 (1912); United
States v. 5 Cases, etc., Figlia Mia Brand, 179 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1950); note 98 supra.
... Although it would seem difficult to find authority for this power in the statutory language,
many courts in dicta have appeared to acknowledge its existence. See cases cited in note 98 supra.
See also A. HERRICK, supra note 42, at 1185.
ssa A. HERRICK, supra note 42, at 1185; Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1947).
10 See note 101 supra, and accompanying text.
'0421 U.S.C. § 372(e)(5) (Supp. I, 1965) provides:
(e) Any officer or employee of the Department designated by the Secretary to con-
duct examinations, investigations, or inspections under this chapter relating to depres-
sant or stimulant drugs or to counterfeit drugs may, when so authorized by the Sec-
retary-
(5) make, prior to the institution of libel proceedings under section 334(a) (2) of
this title, seizures of drugs or containers or of equipment, punches, dies, plates,
stones, labeling, or other things, if they are, or he has reasonable grounds to believe
that they are, subject to seizure and condemnation under such section 334(a)(2).
In the event of seizure pursuant to this paragraph (5), libel proceedings under section
334(a) (2) of this title shall be instituted promptly and the property seized be placed
under the jurisdiction of the court.
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Value of Seizure, Libel and Condemnation. Similar to other powers for en-
forcement of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the power of seizure serves
a specific purpose in the regulatory scheme. Perhaps the clearest value of
seizure, libel, and condemnation lies in the fact that drugs or goods viola-
tive of the Act may be prevented from reaching the hands of the con-
sumer. Thus, unlike the injunction, or criminal prosecution, which at best
affect persons with control over potentially harmful goods, the seizure
provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act reach the goods them-
selves. Although with respect to seizure of adulterated or misbranded goods
there must be (or must have been) movement of the goods in interstate
commerce, the goods may even be seized from the consumer once this
requirement is satisfied."°' For the owner of goods subject to libel, however,
the remedy is rather harsh. If seizure is threatened, the owner may have
little choice but to acquiesce in administrative objections to the goods.
Such an owner may choose to defend in libel proceedings against condemna-
tion of the goods, but the cost of so doing, and in many cases the risk that
the goods will deteriorate, is prohibitive. The significant threat which
seizure poses to the owner of drugs or other goods may effectively grant
the administrative body adjudicatory power. '
Because section 334 (b) provides that the procedure applicable in libel
proceedings is to conform "as nearly as possible" to the procedure in
admiralty, many questions are raised with respect to the extent of the
application of Admiralty Rules. In the trial of the libel, the better view
is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply."7 Although this makes
applicable deposition and pretrial discovery in accordance with the Rules,"6
other aspects of the proceeding are governed by judicial doctrine develop-
0' The leading case seems to be United States v. Olsen, 161 F.2d 669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 768 (1947). In Olsen a device (within the meaning of the Act) was found to be mis-
branded, and was seized from the consumer, an individual, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1964).
The court of appeals quickly dismissed the consumer's contention that the seizure was not con-
stitutionally permissible. It is interesting to observe the reaction of the federal district court upon
the Government's petition for process to seize the device in the case above: "I have before me the
petition of the United States Attorney to issue an order of seizure . . . . Of course I must issue
the order . . . . The policy of entering private homes to seize articles is governmental madness ....
I am sad that the policy has to be enforced in this court." United States v. One Article of Device
Labeled Spectro-Chrome, 77 F. Supp. 50 (D. Ore. 1948). The constitutionality of § 334 which
the court found to be so clear, was supported by the decision in United States v. 935 Cases more
or less, etc., Tomato Puree, 136 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1943). That case involved a seizure pursuant
to process issued in libel proceedings. Although the court upheld the authority of federal officers
to seize goods under § 334, its reasoning is not entirely clear. It found first that the libel pro-
ceedings are not criminal in nature, and from that finding seemed to conclude that the fourth
amendment does not protect against seizure pursuant to civil actions. However, it also determined
that there could be no search or invasion if the seizure is for the purpose of deciding whether
the goods are fit for use. Finally, it seemed to rest the constitutionality of § 334 upon the com-
merce clause, finding that seizure such as involved in the case was merely a means appropriate to
the end of protecting interstate commerce. It would seem, in light of Camara and other recent
cases interpreting the fourth -amendment requirement for warrants issued on probable cause, that
none of the reasons announced by the court of appeals above effectively answers constitutional ob-
jections to summary seizure of goods without at least judicial process in the absence of an emer-
gency situation.
108 Developments in the Law of Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1005, 1113 (1967).
7 United States v. 38 Cases, etc., Figlia Mia Brand, 99 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United
States v. 88 Cases, etc., of Bireley's Orange Bev., 5 F.R.D. 503 (D.N.J. 1946), revd on other
grounds, 187 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1951). But see United States v. 720 Bottles, etc., Vanilla Extract,
3 F.R.D. 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1944).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
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ing around the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. For example, at least one
case has held the Government to a higher standard of proof than a mere
preponderance of the evidence,"° although no court has held that the
Government must establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt. What
must be proved, of course, is that the goods themselves are, or are the
product of, a violation of the Act.
Another question which has arisen in connection with the seizure of
goods pursuant to libel proceedings is the nature of the process to be issued
for their seizure-specifically, whether such process must meet require-
ments imposed on searches and seizures by the fourth amendment. De-
cisions dealing with this question have interpreted the Admiralty Rules
not to require oath or affirmation of probable cause.11 However, in 1966,
the Admiralty Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were uni-
fied."1 Now, supplementary rule C(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure,11 dealing with complaints in in rem actions, may require oath and
affirmation. The rule provides for such oath or affirmation in the filing
of complaints for libel, but provides that if the complaint charges a viola-
tion of law, it must specify several things, none of which are probable
cause for seizure of violative goods. Accordingly, the rule seems to admit
the interpretation that no oath or affirmation is necessary."
Proposed Legislation. As was observed above, S. 3246 does not purport to
deal with all aspects of drug regulation. Accordingly, the bill would leave
substantially in force section 334. However, because the bill proposes to
regulate a wider range of drugs than formerly covered by the terms "de-
pressant and stimulant drugs" in the 1938 Act and subsequent amend-
ments, all references to "stimulant and depressant" drugs would be elimi-
nated. Several specific effects of the proposed legislation are as follows.
First, section 334(a) (1) would remain unchanged. Its application, as
now, would be limited to regulation of adulterated or misbranded drugs.
Although the question seems fairly raised that executive seizure of adul-
terated or misbranded goods is not authorized, S. 3246 proposes no changes
in that respect to section 334(a) (1). Also, the bill does not effect any
5
°
9 Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. United States, 82 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1936). The more widely
accepted view is announced in United States v. Articles of Drug, etc., "Cal's Tupelo Blossom U.S.
Fancy Pure Honey," 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965).
"'United States v. 935 Cases more or less, etc., Tomato Puree, 136 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1943);
United States v. 18 Cases of Tuna Fish, 5 F.2d 979 (W.D. Va. 1925). But see United States v.
Eight Packages and Casks of Drugs, 5 F.2d 971 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1910).
... The former Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, promulgated by the Supreme
Court in 1920, were rescinded effective July 1, 1966. Now in effect are the Supplemental Rules for
Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
s"a SUPPLEMENTAL ADMIRALTY RULE C(2), superceded former Admiralty Rules 21, 22.
11 Although supplemental rule C(2) is said to incorporate former rules 21 and 22, it is not
clear whether it also supports the interpretation given those rules, that no oath or affirmation is
required. Several views seem possible. First, it may be said that the requirement for oath or affirma-
tion included in the new rule is simply the provision for oath or affirmation required by former
rule 22 for instance causes, and accordingly, no such requirement exists in the case of seizures
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Second, it could be said that the provision for oath or
affirmation under the new rule applies only where the seizure is not for a violation of "any statute




changes in the requirement for movement of adulterated or misbranded
goods in interstate commerce prior to seizure. Second, under the bill, sec-
tion 334(a) (2) would apply only to seizure of counterfeit drugs, their
containers, and related equipment."' Provisions in section 334 (a) (2) form-
erly dealing with stimulant and depressant drugs would be covered by
substantive provisions of the bill.' 5 Third, section 372 (e) would no longer
apply to "stimulant or depressant drugs,""... since under the bill these drugs
largely are regulated as controlled dangerous substances. Although section
372 (e) (5), which now authorizes executive seizure of drugs subject to
section 334(a) (2), would remain in force, it would apply only to seizure
of counterfeit drugs in keeping with the changes in the latter section. No
attempt is made by the bill to bring adulterated or misbranded drugs
within the ambit of section 372 (e) (5), and thus within the express statu-
tory authority for executive seizure.
Section 704"" of S. 3246 provides the seizure and forfeiture power for
the proposed legislation. The items which would be subject to seizure are:
1. All controlled dangerous substances "handled" in violation of the
Act;
2. Raw materials, products, and equipment used or intended for use in
"handling" controlled dangerous substances in violation of the Act;
3. Property used or intended for use as a container for items in the
first two categories above;
4. Conveyances (except for conveyances of common carriers used
unknowingly or a conveyance used by other than the owner in
unlawful possession)."*
The bill provides for both judicial and executive seizures." In the first
case the property is to be seized under process issued by a district court
having jurisdiction over the property in accordance with the Supplemental
Rules for Admiralty and Maritime Claims."2 Accordingly, the seizure
process pursuant to libel proceedings (with process) is identical to that
now in effect under rule C(2)."'
However, it is significant that the bill provides for the seizure of prop-
erty in certain instances without such process. The instances enumerated
by section 704(b) are:
1. When the seizure is incident to an arrest or pursuant to the execu-
tion of a search warrant or administrative inspection warrant;
2. When the property to be seized has been the subject of a prior
judgment for the United States;
114 S. 3246, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 902(f), (g) (1969).
"'5 Id. § 704(a).
"
6 d. § 202.
" id. § 704.
nSThe section also provides for seizure and forfeiture of all books, records, and research, in-
cluding formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which are used or intended for use in violation of
the act. Id.
"
9 Id. § 704(b).
' This is merely the terminology for the new rules. See note 111 supra.
1' See note 112 supra, and accompanying text.
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3. When the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the
property is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or
4. When the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the
property has been used or is intended to be used in violation of
the act.
It is important to recognize that under the bill, the seizure provisions apply
with equal force to all drugs covered by the proposed legislation-a situa-
tion unlike that under existing law.
One objection to the "warrantless" seizure provisions of the bill has
been to the breadth of section 704 (b) (4) (No. 4 above). It has been
urged that provision for seizure of goods without process, where the At-
torney General has probable cause to believe that they are to be used in
violation of the Act, obviates the necessity of ever obtaining the process."
However, as was observed before, this provision does not seem to grant
any authority which is not now available under section 334(a) (2) and
section 372 (e) (5) with respect to stimulant and depressant drugs. Al-
though one way to remedy this problem would be to strike the provision
entirely, it would seem that a suitable compromise would be achieved by
use of the following language: "When the Attorney General has probable
cause to believe that the property has been used or is intended to be used
in violation of this Act, and circumstances render it impracticable to ob-
tain judicial process." This language would provide by statute for what is
clearly constitutionally permissible in the same manner as section 703 of
the bill provides for certain warrantless inspections."
Another objection, with respect to the seizure provisions of the bill
generally, is that the property made subject to forfeiture, and hence
seizure, imposes an excessively harsh penalty on persons committing a
minor or unintentional violation.M It is reasoned that an entire business
effectively could be closed by seizure of drugs, equipment, and other
property merely for failure to comply with a small requirement of the
proposed legislation (and perhaps one not related to the goods seized). It
is possible that forfeiture and seizure could be limited in application to
violations of section 302 (a) of the bill-the requirement that persons
intending to engage in certain activities relating to controlled dangerous
substances register with the Attorney General." However, despite the
merit in these objections, it seems clearly unworkable to limit forfeiture
to persons who have failed to register. Registration in itself accomplishes
little. Even if a "presumption of lawful activity" could be afforded per-
sons properly registered, it is no answer to put such persons entirely be-
yond the reach of the governmental seizure power.
It is interesting to compare these features of S. 3246, generally, with
provisions and developments under existing law commented on above.
Although in many ways the provision for executive seizure under the bill
122 Hearings on S. 2637 and S. 1895 Before the Subcomm. onm Juvenile Delinquency of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 253 (1969).
1 See note 87 supra, and accompanying text.
124See Hearings, note 122 supra, at 3.
l.S. 3246, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(a) (1969).
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seems to broaden the seizure power,' it is clear that in at least one re-
spect the power of the Attorney General is limited. Under section
372 (e) (5), the executive seizure authorized for depressant and stimulant
goods is not expressly conditioned upon a showing of probable cause, as
is the warrantless seizure authorized by section 705 of the bill. At least
arguably under the former provision, a lesser degree of certainty that the
Act had been violated would support seizure of goods prior to the institu-
tion of libel proceedings. However, the decisions in Camara and See sug-
gest that provisions under existing law may rest on less than solid consti-
tutional ground. It is clear that the Court was silent in those decisions on
the effect which the requirement for warrants and probable cause in in-
spections may have on other areas of the law. Nevertheless, the Court
reaffirmed in Camara the principle that under the fourth amendment, a
search of private property is unreasonable unless it is authorized by a valid
search warrant"' based on probable cause-a principle which also must
apply to seizures. The only exception to this principle which the Court
expressly recognized is the entrance of government officials in emergency
situations. It cited several cases involving the seizure of unsafe goods to
support this exception," but it is not clear whether it interpreted such
dangers to public health always to constitute an emergency. It is generally
acknowledged that to dispense with the requirement of a warrant in cer-
tain instances is not also to dispense with the requirement of probable
cause."' Although the warrantless seizure provisions of S. 3246 seem to
avoid this problem, it seems clear that existing section 372 (e) (5) may be
subject to attack for not meeting fourth and fourteenth amendment re-
quirements."'
V. SUBPENA
One of the most significant enforcement powers under existing drug
legislation is the "administrative subpena" power provided by section
198a."' Unlike the other enforcement powers discussed above, section
.2. The bill broadens the seizure power principally by making all classes of drugs (controlled
dangerous substances) subject to seizure. Id. §§ 704(a) (1), (b).
127387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
128North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio
St. 610, 165 N.E. 498 (1929).
121 Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
"'Some of the constitutional questions raised by the seizure power are discussed in Carden,
Federal Power To Seize and Search Without a Warrant, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1964).
31 21 U.S.C. § 198a (1964). Compare the judicial subpena provided under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 337 (1964). At one time the authorization of ad-
ministrative subpena was thought to be beyond the power of Congress. However, objections to
such subpenas were principally where they were authorized for use in matters not related to law
enforcement or adjudication. Although objections such as these may still have merit with respect
to general subpenas, it should be noted that existing law [21 U.S.C. § 198a (1964)] limits use
of the administrative subpena power to investigations which the Secretary of the Treasury con-
siders necessary to the enforcement of laws relating to marijuana and narcotics. The proposed
legislation would not seem to be so restrictive, applying to "any matter relating to the control of
dangerous substances." Compare Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936) (rejecting use of administrative
subpena even for law enforcement) with McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (finding
the subpena to be a part of the legislative function, but not deciding whether the power may




198a is not a part of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, but
rather is a part of the laws relating to narcotics and marijuana. Because
these substances are generally not processed by the drug industry, the
subpena power provided by section 198a has not been of direct import-
ance in industrial regulation. However, S. 3246 provides for administra-
tive subpena in the regulation of controlled dangerous substances, ' and
because of this fact, the administrative subpena merits attention. Section
198a provides that "for the purpose of any investigation" which the
Secretary of the Treasury considers necessary to the enforcement of nar-
cotics and marijuana laws, he is empowered to (1) administer oaths, (2)
subpena witnesses, (3) compel the attendance of witnesses, (4) take evi-
dence, and (5) require the production of any records (including books,
papers, documents, and tangible things which constitute or contain evi-
dence) which he finds relevant or material to the investigation. Prior to
enactment of section 198a, it was necessary for the Secretary to obtain
subpenas through a federal court. Because of the frequent difficulty in pro-
ducing sufficient evidence to obtain a judicial subpena, valuable material
and information often was unavailable.1"
Although the section has not been the subject of much litigation, several
recent cases indicate some of the values of the power and at the same time
some of the problems raised by its use. In the first case, United States v.
Pardo-Bolland,'" defendants had arranged to meet in New York where
they planned to effect the purchase and sale of a substantial quantity of
heroin. Upon arrival in New York, one of the defendants, the seller, sent
a cablegram to an accomplice, presumably to advise him that he had
arrived and was prepared to make the sale. When by accident the buyer
and seller failed to meet as planned, the seller sent another cablegram to
the accomplice. Although this cablegram, like the first, was "coded," it
was apparently for the purpose of verifying the place at which the meet-
ing was to have taken place. In each instance when the cablegram was
sent, a federal narcotics agent witnessed the transaction between the sender
and the Western Union operator, and obtained a copy of the transmission
from the operator. When the defendants subsequently were arrested and
charged with violation of the narcotics laws, they contended that the
cablegrams were inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in
violation of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act.11 That sec-
tion basically provides that no communications agent shall divulge the
existence or contents of an interstate or foreign message except in response
to a subpenaN or on demand of other lawful authority, and that no per-
son unauthorized by the sender shall intercept and divulge the contents of
the message. The Government contended (1) that the action of the agent
132 S. 3246, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 606 (1969).
"
' See U.S. CODE CONG. AND An. NEws 3017 (1955).
'348 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1965).
" Federal Communications Act S 605, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
" The subpena to which the statute refers is a "subpena issued by a court of competent




in obtaining the content of the message constituted a "demand of other
lawful authority," or in the alternative, (2) that because the agent de-
termined the existence of the cablegrams from his own independent and
lawful observation, and because the content of the cablegrams was also
discovered pursuant to an administrative subpena under section 198a,
the evidence was admissible. ta' Although the court rejected the Govern-
ment's first contention, it found the cablegrams admissible on the alterna-
tive argument. It determined that even though the agent violated section
605 of the Federal Communications Act in learning the content of the
messages, the evidence was admissible because the cablegrams could have
been, and were, subpenaed independently of that violation.
It seems that the principal significance of Pardo-Bolland lies not in the
type of evidence found available under the administrative subpena, but
rather in the fact that the subpena power may render admissible, under
certain circumstances, evidence which was obtained illegally by a narcotics
agent. There is little question that the "doctrine of independent source"
supports the decision in this case.'
However, two recent cases, though reaching a similar result, raise a
question about the availability of such information pursuant to an ad-
ministrative demand. In DiPiazza v. United States"'o and United States v.
Michigan Bell Telephone Co."" the Internal Revenue Service attempted to
exercise a statutory summons.. in order to obtain records of certain long-
distance telephone calls. In DiPiazza records were obtained which tended
to implicate the defendant in illegal wagering operations. On trial for
violation of wagering tax laws, the defendant contended that the records
should not be admissible as evidence because they were obtained in viola-
tion of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act. In the second
case, attempts by the Government to obtain similar records were un-
successful because of the telephone company's refusal to comply with the
demand. The company, tried for contempt of the Internal Revenue sum-
mons, likewise defended on the ground that the records were protected
by section 605.
The first issue presented to the court in each case was whether the
summons could be employed where it would reveal evidence which could
be used in a criminal prosecution. The courts determined on the basis of
prior decisions, that if civil tax liability also would be shown by the evi-
dence, the summons would not in itself be improper.'" The second issue
... Apparently the court determined that the administrative subpena constituted "other lawful
authority" within the meaning of the statute.
"' Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
139415 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1969).
140415 F.2d 1284 (6th Cir. 1969).
141 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7602.
142 Although the court treated this question as one of statutory limitation, it appears that a
constitutional question may be raised. The statute providing for the Internal Revenue summons
(see note 141 supra) seems to limit the use of the summons to instances where the taxpayer's tax
liability is to be determined. However, one of the first cases to deal with the question found the
summons to enter the domain of the grand jury where it was used for the purpose of gathering
information in connection with a criminal prosecution which had already begun. United States v.
O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953). Later, in Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir.
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was whether the telephone company in each instance had violated section
605 by the "interception" of calls for the purpose of making and main-
taining records. The courts found that such recordkeeping was not an
interception within the meaning of the section, and therefore not a violation
of the statute. It is significant, however, that the records involved in these
instances were only slightly more detailed than the records sent to sub-
scribers at the end of each month for purposes of billing.
The most important issue presented to the courts was whether the de-
mand by the summons would require a "divulgence" in violation of the
Federal Communications Act. In DiPiazza the court held that the In-
ternal Revenue summons constituted a "lawful authority" within the
meaning of section 605, and therefore was a proper device for obtaining
records of communications. However, the fact situation in DiPiazza oc-
curred prior to amendment of section 605, as did the fact situation in
Pardo-Bolland. In 1968, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act,' which included a revision of section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act. The amendment of section 605'" and the
inclusion of several safeguards against diversion of communications, such
as the requirement for a judicial order authorizing interception," may
have an effect on decisions such as Pardo-Bolland and DiPiazza. Indeed,
the court remanded the case in Michigan Bell Telephone for the district
court to determine the effects of the Omnibus Crime Act, since the fact
situation in that case arose after amendment of section 605. Although
the Omnibus Crime Act generally has increased the controls over the dis-
semination of communications, nothing in that Act or in the amendment
to section 605 would seem to demand a different interpretation of "other
lawful authority" than that in the cases above. Nevertheless, until the
district court decides the question, the relationship between section 605
and the administrative subpena power will not be entirely clear.
It is interesting to observe that the proposed provision for administrative
subpena'" provides, as does existing law, for judicial enforcement of the ad-
ministrative subpena. Moreover, failure to comply with the subpena once
the aid of the court has been invoked, may be punished as contempt. Un-
like the contempt proceedings provided by existing law in the case of
1956), the court found that if the summons also produced evidence which would be relevant in
determining the taxpayer's tax liability, its use would be proper, The decision in Boren was followed
in Birdsall v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Fla. 1967), but there the court indicated
that even if the summons were used to produce evidence relating to a person's tax liability, a mo-
tion to suppress the evidence might be appropriate if the evidence were later offered in connection
with criminal prosecution. None of these decisions makes clear the basis for the distinction be-
tween use of the summons for civil purposes, and use of it for criminal prosecution. The answer
may lie in the decision in DiPiazza. Use of such an administrative demand will be accorded a
wide discretion, but the right aaginst self-incrimination may prevent use in criminal proceedings of
information thus obtained.
" Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197.
'447 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. IV, 1968), amending 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
145 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (Supp. IV, 1968). This section requires written application for an order
authorizing interception of communications subject to the Federal Communications Act. Among
other things, the judge must be satisfied, before issuing the order, that other means of obtaining
the information have been tried (or would be fruitless), that interception of a communication is
necessary, and that there is probable cause to believe that some crime is being committed.
40S. 3246, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. S 606 (1969).
1970]
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injunctions, no provision is made in either existing law or proposed law
for the nature of the contempt proceedings. Although the question has
yet to arise, it seems clear that the decision in Bloom may have significant
effect on the power to conduct proceedings such as this, without certain
safeguards such as the right to trial by jury. Of course, Bloom's effect may
not be felt unless the punishment for contempt is sufficiently great to
make the contempt a "serious" offense. However, if the failure to com-
ply with the subpena also constitutes a crime (such as the failure to pro-
duce records which must be produced upon demand under the Act), the
constitutional question is again raised. Also, the Supreme Court has held
that administrative subpenas are not without constitutional protection in
other respects. For example, the Court has held that such subpenas must
be sufficiently specific and limited in scope as not to be unreasonably
burdensome."7
VI. CONCLUSION
This discussion of current and proposed legislation demonstrates that
the much-amended statutory scheme for the regulation of drugs has been
greatly affected by developments in many areas other than law. It is clear
that new drug laws are needed. While the proposed legislation alters some-
what the scope of governmental enforcement powers, and generally at-
tempts to incorporate current constitutional doctrine, it is equally clear
that even if Congress approves the proposals now before it, much remains
to be done.
1' See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632
(1950).
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